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Since  1981,  American  agricultural  export  rity Act of 1985 extended the in-kind export
earnings  have  plummeted  from  $43  billion  subsidy  program  to  all  potential  exporters
to around  $29 billion for 1985, a 37 percent  and mandated that at least $2 billion be spent
decline.  Many  factors  have  been  offered  as  on this program  in the next  3 years. As such,
partial  explanations  for this phenomenon:  a  there is significant sentiment in Congress and
strong dollar, the continued fallout from the  in  other  quarters  that  the  only  solution  to
grain  embargo  placed  by the  Carter  Admin-  many  of our  current  trade  problems  in  ag-
istration  on the Soviet Union, poor American  riculture is the continued and expanded sub-
marketing practices  in international  agricul-  sidization of our agricultural exports. Standard
tural  markets,  debt  problems  in  heretofore  trade  theory  unstintingly  shows  that  export
rapidly developing third-world countries that  subsidization  is  a  self-defeating  policy  that
had  been  among  our  fastest  growing  ex-  perpetuates  and exacerbates  trade problems
port  markets,  and  uncompetitive  practices  rather  than cures them.  In this presentation,
spawned  by the foreign trade policies  of our  I want to argue from a slightly different  per-
major  competitors  in  international  agricul-  spective  that  good  reasons  exist  to  believe
tural markets.  My job today is  to address the  that  export  subsidies  and  the  like  may  not
last, and to some extent the first, item in this  achieve  some  of the  ends in the  real  world
litany of complaints with a peculiar emphasis  that  back  of the  envelope  theory  suggests.
upon  what  implications  these  have  for  the  The  reason  is that  in formulating  such  pol-
future  of Southern  agricultural  exports.  In  icies we  all too  often ignore  the  root cause
what follows, I am intentionally going to give  of  other  nations'  international  agricultural
the  future  of southern  agricultural  exports  policies.
short  shift in order to  comment  upon  some  The  main  idea  that  I  want  to  pursue  in
points,  which  apply  to  a  broader  menu  of  what  follows  is that  prior  to being  able  to
commodities than just those produced  in the  forecast just how and why international  pol-
South. To the extent that this represents false  icies impinge upon southern agricultural ex-
advertising,  I apologize  and plead  extenuat-  ports, we need a clear idea of just what these
ing circumstances  as well as comparative  ad-  policies are trying to accomplish  in a generic
vantage.  sense. We often operate under the assumption
As  a  reaction  to  the  continual  erosion  of  that export  subsidies  are  simply paid to ex-
export  markets  for United  States  farm  prod-  pand  exports  without  recognizing  that  the
ucts,  we  have  witnessed  in  recent  months  need  to expand  exports  is  really predicated
the  creation  of an  agricultural  export  com-  upon  domestic  policy  considerations,  such
mission  investigating  the  disappearance  of  as full employment or surplus disposal. Thus,
these markets and the establishment of an in-  in  considering  policies  to  deal with  export
kind export  subsidy  program  that has  come  subsidization,  it  seems  logical  to  consider
to be  referred  to as the Export  Enhancement  the  policy  goals  that  spawned  the  practice
Program  and under which a  number  of sub-  in order to devise  efficient  means for count-
sidized sales of American farm products have  ering or dealing with such effects. The frame-
been  made.  The  recently  passed  Food  Secu-  work that  I intend  to use  is  to consider the
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61formulation  of public policy  that affects  in-  convex set which we denote  as T.  At the loss
ternational  trade as  a classic  case  of Ramsey  of some generality, we shall dichotomize be-
taxation:  maximization  of  national  welfare  tween  inputs  and  outputs  throughout  the
subject to various policy constraints that pro-  presentation.  Inputs are  denoted  as x and  in
hibit the achievement of first-best equilibria.  what  follows  we  shall  use  x to  denote  the
The  main  axiom  that  I  work  from  is that  aggregate  input  endowment  of  the  country
there  is  no  such  thing  as  a  purely  interna-  in question.  Outputs  are  denoted by  y  and
tional  policy.  What  we  in  the  United  States  are assumed  to be  strictly positive.  An alter-
perceive  as international  policies are usually  native characterization  of T is offered  by the
the outward  manifestation  of other countries  economy's  revenue  function  which  we  de-
domestic  policies.  In  understanding  inter-  note  as R(p,x)  and define  by:
national policy,  therefore,  I  feel that the key
is  to  try  to  understand  the  underlying  do-  (1)  R(p,x)  =  Max  [py:  (x,y)  belongs  to
mestic  policy.  Clear  examples  of  domestic  T].
policies that eventually became  international
policies,  albeit  to  countries  other  than  the  R(p,x)  is linearly homogeneous, nondecreas-
United States,  are our decision as a nation to  ing,  and  convex  in p  and nondecreasing  in
maintain  a  domestic  sugar  producing  capa-  x.  Here p is taken to be a vector of the same
bility even in the face of our obvious absolute  dimension  as  y  of  strictly  positive  prices.
and comparative  disadvantages  in this  area.  Furthermore,  if it  is  differentiable,  then  its
Maintenance  of  high  domestic  loan  rates  gradient  in x represents  a vector  of shadow
and  a  no  forfeiture  policy  imposed  first  by  prices.
Congressional  intent  and  later  by  Congres-  For  convenience,  we  presume  that  there
sional mandate  have  made the use  of restric-  exists  an  aggregate  community  indifference
tive  import  quotas  almost  inevitable.  As  a  function  defined  over  the  domain  of  y  in
consequence,  many  sugar-producing  coun-  which  we  represent  as  U(y).  U(y)  is  pre-
tries have to deal with the international  sugar  sumed to  be  nondecreasing  in y  and  quasi-
policy  of the  United  States  that  has  really  concave  in y.  In what follows, we shall  sim-
grown out of a purely domestic policy. Other  plify  matters  greatly  by presuming  that  the
examples  from  our  collective  memories  country in question is small and cannot affect
would  include  the  use  of subsidies  by  the  world prices.  I fully realize that making this
United States to export its surplus commodity  assumption begs the most important question
production before  the export  boom  in  agri-  of international trade policy, but it also makes
cultural products of the early  1970s and the  it easier both notationally and analytically for
use  by  the  European  Community  currently  me  to  make  the  central  point of the  paper.
of export  refunds  (subsidies)  to export  the  The  arguments  made  below  can  be  readily
surplus production caused by its variable levy  extended  to the  case  of a  large  country  by
cum  intervention  price  system.  In what fol-  straightforward  calculation  and  manipula-
lows,  I  make  a brief attempt to consider the  tion.  The  indirect  trade  utility  function
effects of three specific domestic policies on  (Woodland),  which  will  be  critical  in  the
international policy.  The three policies con-  following  analysis,  is  defined  as:
sidered are  agricultural  self-sufficiency  (this
may be loosely associated for at least nemonic  (2)  b  =  [  ()
purposes  with  the  European  Community), 
revenue generation through the use of export 
taxes  and  import  tariffs  (many  developing  et  neeartoa
gregate  income  as  a  result  of international countries  essentially  tax  agriculture  to  fi-  traner  e  collectio  of internationa
nance other domestic policy goals), and  spe- 
cific  sectoral  income  goals.  Before  I  discuss  evenue.
these issues,  however,  it will be  convenient  Suppose  now that  prevailing prices  in  in-
for me  to  introduce  the  model  and  the no-  ternational  markets  can  be  denoted  as  p. for me'to  introduce  the  model  and  the no-  Remember we have assumed that the country
tation that  I intend  to use  for the remainder  Remember we have assumed that the country
ttof  the  paper.t  nedt  soheane  in question views these prices as given. With of the  paper. these definitions,  any revenue collected from
THE MODEL  export taxes or tariffs or extra disbursements
required  as  a  result  of export  subsidies  can
The  productive  technology of the country  be written  as:
or group of countries  in question is assumed
to be characterized by a closed, compact, and  (3)  (p*-p)  e(p,x)  =  t e(p,x),
62where e(p,x)  now  denotes the vector of ex-  where  K is the set containing  the indexes of
cess  supplies  associated  with  the  indirect  all commodities  for which self sufficiency  is
trade  utility function  and t  is  obviously  the  a goal.  Formally,  their decisionmaking  proc-
associated vector of taxes or subsidies. Using  ess  might be  modelled by:
a balanced trade constraint,  this allows us to
rewrite  the indirect trade  utility function  as  (5)  Max [H(p,pe(p,x),x):  e  (p,x)  >  0  for
H(p,  pe(p,x),  x)  (Woodland,  p. 913).  all kEK].
Using the Kuhn-Tucker  conditions, we see
SELF  SUFFICIENCY  OR  FOOD  SECURITY  after  some  manipulation  using  results  con-
tained  in Woodland  (p.  909,  eq.  (6))  that
Unlike  many other  products  traded  in  in-  the first  order conditions  for an  interior  so-
ternational  markets,  trade  in  food  is  often  lution require:
subject to national  security or food security
arguments; i.e.,  most countries are unwilling  e  H  i  =  e  ~  0e
to rely  totally  on world markets  for the  ne-  (6b  i  pj  k&K  9p;
cessities  of  life  for fear that their  supply  of
these commodities  might dry up in times of  which  is  a  fairly  obvious  extension  of  the
national  or international  emergency. A  num-  usual  Ramsey pricing rule familiar  from  the
ber of developed and developing nations have  literature  on public  finance.  As  such,  I will
as  explicit national  goals  self sufficiency  in  not take up too much time discussing it other
basic  foodstuffs.  For  example,  the  Treaty  of  than to say that for most indirect trade utility
Rome in  1957 specifically lists food security  functions  it rules out the possibility of pro-
as an objective  of the European  Community.  portional  taxation  of subsidization.  Further-
At least partly toward this end, the European  more,  for the  case of a  single subsidy  and  a
Community  has  set up  its  common  agricul-  single  self-sufficiency  constraint,  this  result
tural policy (CAP)  which many believe is the  is also consistent  in an intuitive fashion with
essential glue behind the overall  structure of  the  usual  inverse  elasticity rule.
the  European  Community.  Under  the  CAP,  What  I  want  to  focus  on  instead  is  the
the European Community has gone from being  reaction  of a  country like  the one described
the largest  importer  of temperate  zone food  previously  to  a  change  in  the world  price.
products  to  the  world's  second  largest  ex-  Remember  for  this  portion  of the  analysis
porter of these same food products. No small  that p=  p*  - t. With this identity in hand and
part  of this  is  attributable  to  its  use  of the  for  analytical  convenience  restricting  our-
variable levy to effectively insulate itself from  selves to the case where  only the goods sub-
world  markets  and  the  maintenance  of  its  ject to the self-sufficiency  constraint are taxed
intervention prices far in excess of what would  and  where  only  the  prices  of  these  same
be necessary to clear world markets.  The not  goods  change,  we find  that  equilibrium  re-
unsurprising result  has  been  excessive  pro-  quires:
duction  and  a  decision  to  dispose  of  this
excessive production  in world markets  using  (7)  dt  =  dp'.
trade subsidies.
In what  follows,  I  do  not intend  to  look  That is, the country in question will respond
at theA,  I  do  t t  to ay change  CAP  in  detail.  However,  I  do wantthe  world price vector  by
pay particular  attention  to the  achievement  holding the internal price constant and vary-
of self sufficiency  in the context  of Ramsey-  ing the  export  subsidy  or eport  tax  as  ap-
like  pricing  decisions.  Since  the  European  Propriate  to  ensure  self-sufficiency.  This
Community  has  decided  to effectively  insu-  relatively obvious result follows directly from
late  itself  from  world  markets  by  pricing  the constraint and is thus independent ofthe
imports of certain food products out of their  objective  function.  It  will  characterize  all
internal  market,  we  can view them as  essen-  programs  that require  a  self-sufficiency  con-
tially setting their internal price-the  inter-  tait  or  any program  that requires  exports
vention price-as a result of a policydecision.  of  these  commodities  to  be  kept  above  a
One aspect of that decision is the policy goal  specified  level.  It is  simple,  neat,  and  intu-
of self sufficiency  which  in our current  no-  itive.  For the case of one constraint and one
tation  is  equivalent to requiring  that:  subsidy,  it  is  illustrated  in  Figure  1. In  the
absence  of internal  price  intervention,  the
(4)  e  (p,x)  >  0 for  k belonging  to  K,  country  illustrated  in  Figure  1 would be  a
63in recent  years.  But,  if you  want  to  do  the
latter,  remember  that  the  current  European
Community  export  subsidy  level  is  around
e(po-t,x)  $5  billion  per  year  while  the  EEP  is  only
funded at $2 billion over 3 years.  Even if the
total  EEP  budget  were  devoted  to  wheat,
/^^\  kt~world  trade would rise by only about 5  per-
.------ _p  cent.  The  European  Community  can  afford
to  sit around  and  try  to  outwait  such pro-
grams.  It  cannot  afford  to  outwait  drastic
reductions in world price levels on the mag-
_(px)  nitude of 20 to  30 percent.  In my  personal
opinion, therefore,  I see little hope for these
export subsidy  programs to achieve any real
gains  for  American  agriculture.  If gains  are
Figure  1.  Self  Sufficiency  and Optimal  Taxes.  to  be  had,  they  are  to  come  from  making
net  importer  of the  commodity  at  the  pre-  ourselves  not just marginally  more  compet-
vailing world price. The  appropriate  Ramsey  itive  in the  short  run, but  very much  more
subsidy then is just the difference p-p*  since  competitive  in the  long run.
it  is  at the internal  price  p that the country
is self-sufficient. If p' falls, the subsidy simply
goes up by the same  amount.  REVENUE  CONSTRAINTS
If  this  result  is  so  simple, why  bother  to  constrained  revenue  case  is  just  the The  constrained  revenue  case  is  just  the show it? The answer is because  I  believe that  is slightly
it is deceptively powerful in explaining some it is deceptively powerful in explaining some  modified to deal with the indirect trade utility
phenomena  that we  have  recently  observed phenomena  that  we  a  have  recently  observed  function.  As  such, it really does not deserve in world markets.  As  I  already  have alluded
to  several  times  in  the  past,  last  year  the  v  m  al teatent in a as  this,  especially  because  the  points that  I United States announced  an Export  Enhance-  as  thi,  espeially  eue  tpon  well-knot
ment Program  (EEP)  that was  to use  in-kind  wsh to make  re  eire  n well-non subsd  i..  . aresults  that  are  derived  in  detail  and  ex- subsidies  against  targeted  subsidizing  ex-  of  standard  references plained  in  a  variety  of standard  references porters.  In  virtually  every  case  so  far,  the 
(see  e.g.  Mirrlees).  The  main  point  is  that European  Community  has  been  the  target.
What  was  the  European  Community's  im-  Ramsey pricing  and second best  taxation  or What  was  the  European  Community's  im-  in gene
mediate reaction? It announced that it would  subsidization,  in general,  do  not usually  re
match the United States'  subsidies  dollar for  quire  equiproportionate  taxes  or  subsidies.
dollar just as the above  model would suggest  Instead, it usually requires just the opposite.
that  a  country  attempting  to  maintain  self-  This  is  important  for  two  reasons.  First,
sufficiency,  or perhaps  in  this  case  market  therearenumbercountriesthat  taxes
share,  would  respond.  Now,  the  European  on agricultural  exports  as  a primary  source
Community's response  was not a  surprise to  of government  revenue.  If  these  countries'
many people.  In the discussions that  led up  policies  can be approximated  by the Ramsey
to formalization of the EEP, many offered this  rule, we should expect to observe differential
observation on the basis of seat of the pants  export  subsidies.  And,  that  is  just  what we
analysis  without  even  resorting  to an  enve-  see.  As  a  primary  example,  we  might  want
lope  much  less  a  Ramsey  tax  model.  And,  to consider the case  of Argentina that makes
depending  upon whom the point was being  heavy  use of export  taxes  to raise  revenue.
made to, the response ranged from nonsense  Their export taxes are levied at different rates
to  good.  Those  saying  nonsense really  be-  as evidenced by the recent Section  301  case
lieved  that  we  could  permanently  expand  the National  Soybean  Processors Association
our export  markets by limited duration  sub-  has  brought  against  the  Argentines  for  the
sidy programs.  Those saying good were hop-  use  of differential  export  taxes  on soybeans
ing  for just  such  a  response  on  the  part  of  and  soybean  crush  products.  The  soybean
the European  Community.  To them,  the EEP  processors  allege  that  this  is  an  attempt  at
was just another mechanism  to put pressure  implicit export subsidization  of crush  prod-
on the European Community CAP budget that  ucts by the Argentines.  As  strange  as  it may
has been severely strained and then expanded  seem  that  export  taxes  can  be manipulated
64to create implicit  export subsidies,  this  is  ak  dYi
theoretical  possibility.  Just  as  clearly,  how-  (9) ei  kEK  aX
ever,  such a  result could  be consistent  with
efficient revenue gathering. And, although the  where  ttk  is  a  Lagrangean  multiplier  as  the
subsidy  may be there,  in fact,  on an a priori  main  result.  In  the  case  of  only  one  con-
basis,  it seems difficult to conclude that such  straint, this result considerably simplifies and
practices wherever  they occur  are any more  tells us that the setting of optimal taxes and
attempts  to artificially stimulate exports than  subsidies  in this case  must  result  in the  ith
are  the  deficiency  payment-target  price  sys-  excess supply being proportional to the effect
tem  used  in the  United States.  on national production  of the ith input when
The  second  reason  that  this  result  is  im-  the factor of production which benefits from
portant  to me is that  in the  last few years,  I  the  constraint  is  expanded.  Here,  the usual
have  increasingly  heard  the argument  made  Ramsey result can be interpreted  in terms of
that  the theory of second  best  suggests  that  elasticities  of national  outputs with respect
agriculture should be subsidized at the same  to the factor endowments  of interest.
rate  as  the  other  sectors  of  the  economy.  These results, quite honestly,  have not been
Usually,  this  argument  is  made  to  call  for  very suggestive to me from an intuitive stand-
higher  agricultural  subsidies.  This,  in  the  point.  In  fact,  the only thing  that  I  can say
Ramsey case, is either false or assumes a very  with  confidence  about  them  is  that  such  a
restrictive  indirect  trade  utility  function.  policy goal again does not necessarily require
proportional  subsidization  or taxation  of all
outputs. Therefore,  it would not be or should
SECTORAL  INCOME  GOALS  not be surprising to see developing countries,
which  for  reasons  of  political  stability  and
The  final  policy that I want to consider  is  the  like  are  often  argued  to  face  such  con-
essentially a policy of favoring certain sectors  straints, imposing differential export taxes on
of the economy over others in terms  of their  agricultural  commodities.
claims on national income. For example, this
could be reflective  of a minimum wage  con-
straint for urban  workers.  If we assume  that  CONCLUDING  REMARKS
T  is  a  cone,  then  such  a  constraint  can  be
easily formalized  in our model since  in that  In this short paper,  I  have tried to analyze
case  the  partial  derivative  of  R(p,x)  with  international  trade policy from a slightly dif-
respect  to any factor  endowment  represents  ferent  perspective  than  usual.  If  anything,
the shadow price of that factor which under  the results  of this analysis  can be described
constant  returns  would  also  equal the  equi-  as  modest  to  meagre.  However,  to me  they
librium  wage.  Because  the endowment  of x  do point the way to  a path which should be
is  taken  as fixed,  we  can represent  this par-  thoroughly  pursued,  i.e.,  the  influence  of
ticular  problem  as  one  of maximizing  the  domestic policy  constraints  on international
indirect  trade utility function  subject to the  trading  practices.  International  trade  theory
constraints:  typically views all such problems as ones that
dR  can  be  easily  handled  by  nondistortionary
(8)  --  ak  for kEK.  lump-sum  transfers. While theoretically  cor-
4Xk  rect,  this view is not as  close  to reality  as it
Here  K now represents  the set of all indices  might be.  And  in  my  limited  experience  in
for  which  we  have  constraints  on  earning  assessing  policy actions,  I have become  con-
power.  As  is  apparent  from  the  discussion  vinced that realistic  policy analysis  involves
surrounding  the  self-sufficiency  case,  this  not eschewing formal analytical methods but
problem  is  almost  mathematically  identical  in using  formal  analytical  methods  to  deal
to  that  earlier  case.  Therefore,  let  me  just  with realistic  constraints.  In the foregoing,  I
skip the presentation of first order conditions  have  tried  to  introduce  some  realistic  con-
and  state  the  main  implication  of the  first  straints  that  I think  are  quite important.
order conditions for this  problem. After  ma-  By way of results,  we have seen that when
nipulation  that  requires  the  recognition  of  faced  with  a  self-sufficiency  constraint  that
the  derivative  and  symmetry  properties  of  countries  may  respond  to  any  attempt  by
R(p,x)  as  well  as  the  homogeneity  of  com-  other  countries  to  lower  prices  simply  by
pensated  excess  supplies,  I  get:  increasing  their  export  subsidy by an  equal
65amount  to compensate  for  the  fall  in inter-  subsidies and/or  taxes in  a world where  de-
national prices.  The usual  results from  Ram-  cisionmakers  face  binding  domestic  policy
sey pricing tell us to expect differential export  constraints.
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